Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Volume 15
Issue 1 Issue 1 - Fall 2012

Article 1

2012

Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of Powers
Max S. Oppenheimer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Max S. Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of Powers, 15 Vanderbilt
Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 1 (2020)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol15/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LAW
VOLUME 15

FALL 2012

NUMBER 1

Patents 101: Patentable Subject
Matter and Separation of Powers
Max Stul Oppenheimer*
ABSTRACT

The definition of statutory subject matter lies at the heart of the
patent system. It is the reflection of Congress's policy decision as to
what types of inventions one may patent. While the congressional
definition of statutory subject matter (in what is now 35 U.S.C. § 101)
has remained fundamentally constant since 1790, the Supreme Court
has reinterpretedand redefined statutory subject matter several times,
leaving lower courts with the frustrating task of trying to develop a
This
coherent jurisprudence against a changing landscape.
inconstancy has introduced uncertainty for inventors who are trying to
make the fundamental decision of whether to maintain a trade secret
or seek patent protection for an innovation. Notwithstanding repeated
admonitions to the lower courts not to read words into the patent
statute, the Supreme Court itself has created three exceptions to the
categories of statutory subject matter established by the clear words of
§ 101: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. This
intervention would be defensible if it were constitutionally required or
if the statutory language were ambiguous, but neither is the case. In
fact, the Court'sparticularintervention is counter to the constitutional
mandate to promote progress. In certain cases, this disincentive may
be sufficient to prevent promising new technologies from ever
developing. This Article proposes that Congress should consider the
judicially created exceptions to the statutory categories of patentable
subject matter and amend the statute so as to end judicial intrusion
into patent policymaking.
* 2012 Max Stul Oppenheimer. B.S. cum laude, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard
Law School; Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Faculty, The Johns Hopkins
University Carey School of Business. Thanks to Kimberly Attardo, UB 2012, for her assistance in
the preparation of this article.
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Congress has just completed a major overhaul of the US patent
statute, reversing the fundamental definition of inventorship that
dated back to 1790, but leaving in place a provision that nearly
prevented the emergence of the computer and biotech industries, and
that threatens the future of emerging technologies such as
nanotechnology.' The scope of "statutory subject matter" has eluded

1.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
("[C]onverting the United States patent system from 'first to invent' to a system of 'first inventor
to file' ....
) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 100(o) (2006)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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definition. 2 While the language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 has remained
fundamentally constant since 1790, the Supreme Court has
reinterpreted and redefined it several times since the Court's first
foray into the subject in 1853.3 This judicial inconstancy has left lower
courts with the frustrating task of trying to develop a coherent
Furthermore, this
jurisprudence against a changing landscape.
who are trying
inventors
for
uncertainty
inconstancy has introduced
to make the fundamental decision of whether to maintain a trade
secret or seek patent protection 4 for an innovation. 5
The current patent statute conditions the grant of a patent on
meeting several criteria. An applicant must file a written application
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 6 which
reviews the application7 to determine whether the claimed invention 8:

35 U.S.C. § 101 lists four categories of "statutory subject matter" that may be
2.
patented: machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and processes. 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2006). These are the only types of inventions that may be patented. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel,
and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .").
See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
3.
See id. There are three types of patents-utility patents granted for new and useful
4.
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, 35 U.S.C. §101; design patents
granted for novel ornamental designs, 35 U.S.C. § 171; and plant patents granted for distinct and
new varieties of plants (other than tubers) that have been asexually reproduced, 35 U.S.C. § 161.
The issues discussed in this article arise only with respect to utility patents.
See id.; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-90 (comparing the protection afforded by trade
5.
secret and patent systems). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
misappropriation of trade secrets-generally, disclosure or use of a trade secret that has been
obtained from the owner by improper means-gives rise to damages and the possibility of
injunctive relief. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2), §§ 2-3 (1985). Under the patent system,
manufacture, use, sale, or importation of a product incorporating a patented invention-whether
obtained from the owner or independently developed-gives rise to damages and the possibility
of injunctive relief. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84 (2006). Thus, the patent system may be viewed as a
mechanism for inducing the holders of trade secrets to disclose them (and therefore surrender
protection under trade secret law) in exchange for a limited-term, but broader scope, monopoly
over certain applications of the trade secrets. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-90; Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).
6.
7.
Id. § 131.
A patent application must contain at least one claim that defines "the subject
8.
matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Id. § 112.
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(1) is statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or process;9
(2) is useful; 10
(3) is novel;"
(4) would not be considered obvious by a hypothetical person of
ordinary skill in the field; 12 and
(5) is described well enough that those in the field can make
and use the invention. 13
The USPTO will issue a patent only for claims it determines
satisfy the statutory requirements, and a challenge to an issued
patent will succeed if the challenger can show that any of these
requirements have not been met.1 4 A court faced with a patent
challenge can invalidate a patent on any of the above grounds.
The definition of statutory subject matter lies at the heart of
the patent system. It is the reflection of Congress's policy decision as
to what types of inventions one may patent. The Supreme Court has
held Congress's power plenary,' 5 and this policy decision is given great
judicial deference. Indeed, as the name implies, it is "statutory."1 6
Notwithstanding repeated admonitions to the lower courts not
to read words into the patent statute, 7 the Court itself has created
three exceptions to the categories of statutory subject matter
established by the clear words of § 101: laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas." Those three exceptions are the root
cause of the difficulties in defining the scope of statutory subject
matter and arguably have delayed the development of the software,
9.
Id. § 101; see also supra note 2.
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Patent Office interprets § 101 to require that the claimed
10.
invention have a "specific, substantial, and credible" use. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107(11) (8th ed. Rev. 8, 2010).

11.

35 U.S.C.

§§ 101-102.

12.
Id. § 103.
Id. § 112.
13.
14.
Id. §§ 101, 131, 151, 282.
15.
See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) ("[Tlhe powers of Congress to
legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution . . ."). For two
copyright cases confirming the scope of Congress's power under the Intellectual Property Clause,
which governs both patents and copyrights, see Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (upholding
a statute restoring copyrights to works which had fallen into the public domain) and Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
16.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
17.
The Supreme Court has "more than once cautioned that courts should not read into
the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed." Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (citations omitted).
18.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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biotech, and nanotechnology industries.1 9 This intervention would be
defensible if it were constitutionally required, but that is not the case.
In fact, the Court's particular intervention is counter to the
constitutional mandate to promote progress; withdrawing patent
protection withdraws the incentive to disclose. The net result of the
Court's efforts to circumscribe patentable subject matter is to deprive
inventors of patents they deserve, and to invite infringement of what
should be valid patents, thereby providing a disincentive to invent. In
certain cases, this disincentive may be sufficient to prevent promising
new technologies from ever developing. The Court has neither cited
evidence nor offered a rationale for concluding that what it perceives
as the cost of overly-broad protection outweighs the cost of losing a
technology entirely.
This Article proposes that Congress should consider the
judicially created exceptions to the statutory categories of patentable
subject matter and revise the statutory definition. Part I traces the
history of the statutory language and judicial interpretation, showing
constancy in the statute but the lack of a consistent judicial theory
Part II examines the arguments
supporting the exceptions.
conceptually justifying limits on statutory subject matter. Part III
examines the two possible bases for judicial intervention: intervention
based on constitutional mandate and intervention based on
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Concluding that intervention
is not constitutionally mandated and the statute is unambiguous,
Part IV reviews the costs and benefits of maintaining the uncertainty
resulting from the judicially created exceptions, and Part V proposes
that Congress amend the statute so as to end judicial intrusion into
patent policymaking.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER

A. Why Statutory Subject Matter?
Given the difficulties and uncertainty surrounding statutory
subject matter, it is reasonable to ask why the requirement exists in
the first place. Why should only certain types of discoveries be
patentable? A simplistic, although sufficient, answer is "because
Congress decided to impose it and the Constitution gave Congress that
power." The Supreme Court has consistently held that "the power of
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the
terms of the Constitution, and .

.

. there are no restraints on its

19.
Joshua Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 59-60 (2011).
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exercise." 20 Courts have been extremely deferential to the terms that
Congress sets.2 1
To understand why Congress might limit patent protection to
certain categories of invention, a brief review of the origins and an
overview of the rules of patents will be helpful.
Patents are government-sanctioned monopolies. 22 While early
English patents were awarded as royal favors, 23 the US patent system
finds antecedents in the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624,24
which was Parliament's reaction to the royal favor system. 25 Modern
patent systems grant monopolies for "things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent." 26
Thus, an optimal patent system would grant patents for
innovations in a manner that generates maximum scientific progress.
Unfortunately, it would be impossible to reach universal agreement on
which system would fit that model of optimality; 27 fortunately, the US
Constitution does not require optimality.
Article I, Section 8
establishes the constitutional basis for the US patent system,
providing that:

20.
McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843); Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 67.
21.
Congress has changed the term of patent protection several times, most recently
changing the term from seventeen years from the date of issue to twenty years from the date of
application, see 35 U.S.C. § 154, and no challenge to its authority to do so has ever reached the
appellate level. In assessing congressional power over copyrights, the other right created by the
Intellectual Property Clause, the Court held the extension of copyright protection for works
already in existence constitutional over a vigorous dissent in which Justice Breyer demonstrated
that the term was nearly unlimited from a discounted cash perspective. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 256-57 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22.
During its term, a US patent gives its owner the right to stop others from making,
using, selling, or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). Violation of these
rights constitutes infringement and gives rise to damages and, subject to equitable
considerations, injunctions. Id. §§ 283-284.
23.
Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 22 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (1994) (noting that
the first patent statute was written against the "backdrop" of English monopoly practices).
24.
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17, 18 (1829).
25.
Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 22 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Walterscheid, supra note 23.
26.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former US President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813) (available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib02O976).
27.
Aaron J. Zakem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject Matter: Are Statutory
Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2988 (2009) ("[I]t has proven difficult to draw an
exclusionary line which disallows inhibitive patents without prejudicing claims on novel and
non-obvious technology, where such analysis is based solely on attempts to categorize all
inventions as either a 'process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter."'). Compare
Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 57 ("[The patent system is not supposed to reward discoveries of basic
science . . . ."), with Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts and Progress in Biomedical
Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 690-91 (2004) (suggesting that strong patent rights induce
hypothesis generation and develop new scientific paradigms).
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The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
28
respective Writings and Discoveries.

The fundamental goal of the patent system is to provide an
adequate incentive to motivate innovators to give up trade secret
rights in their innovation.29 In theory, disclosure of a trade secret
benefits society more broadly than does maintaining a trade secret
since it permits more people to make use of the information as a
starting point for further innovation, thereby opening the door to
competition.30
Since the patent statute is designed to promote technological
progress through the incentive of a limited-term monopoly in
exchange for disclosure of what could otherwise be maintained as a
trade secret, the choice of requirements for patentability influences
the type of innovation that the statute promotes.31 The statute does
not incentivize categories of inventions that it excludes from
patentability and therefore inventors are less likely to develop and
disclose those categories of inventions. The choice is one of policy and
Congress should make it, subject to constitutional constraints.
In drafting and revising the patent statute, Congress has
received little guidance from the records of the Constitutional
Convention. 32 The very existence of the Intellectual Property Clause
is curious; it is one of the more specific powers in a document
otherwise given to broad principles.3 3 The records of the Convention
28.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a "trade secret" as:
[1]nformation . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). Issued patents are published and available at the
Patent Office, and a full text database is also available online, which is updated weekly. See U. S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., (Sept. 2, 2012, 10:48 PM), www.uspto.gov. Publication of a patent
destroys the associated trade secrets by two mechanisms: it makes them generally known and it
is a failure to make reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1
(amended 1985).
30.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 483.
31.
For a detailed history of how the clause was drafted and adopted, see Walterscheid,
32.
supra note 23, at 1-56. See also 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 325, 322 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966).
As Walterscheid points out:
33.
In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention: 1. To
insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government should be clogged by
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be
accommodated to times and events. . . . 2. To use simple and precise language, and
general propositions ....

8
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and the ratification debates are virtually silent on the subject. 34 The
full Convention adopted the Intellectual Property Clause without
debate and with little record of committee deliberations. 35 The patent
language, in particular, appears to have been added in committee with
no record of who made the addition or why. 3 6 Guided only by the
language of the Clause itself, courts have placed few restrictions on
Congress, the principle restriction being that the patent power is a
"qualified authority . . . limited to the promotion of advances in the
'useful arts."' 37

The system Congress created provides a delicate balance. The
patent statute promotes technological progress through the monopoly
it offers for the creation and disclosure of something new. 3 8 In
exchange, the innovator must provide a description of how to make
and use the invention so that, once the patent expires, the public has

.

Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 2.
See generally Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 31-34; cases collected in Max Stul
34.
Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent
Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445 (2007).
Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or CreatedRights: Early Views on the Intellectual
35.
Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995) ("No delegate to the Constitutional
Convention has left any record concerning the interpretation or meaning placed on the
Intellectual Property Clause by the delegates themselves.").
36.
Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 26, 51 ("There is no record to indicate how the
intellectual property proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney were transformed into this
clause."). There are a number of possible explanations for this lack of debate: (1) support for
patent rights was universal so there was nothing to debate, Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent
System: The Past is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 437, 440 (1980) ("The delegates clearly
believed firmly that it was in the public interest to establish a patent and copyright system."); (2)
patents were so unimportant that no one cared, Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 16 ("One
indication of the relatively low value attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found
of any litigation involving colonial patents of monopoly for invention in any colonial or English
court."); and (3) the Convention had more important issues to resolve and limited time:
The absence of debate over the patent provision . . . has been taken as proof of their
firm belief in patents as the best way to encourage socially beneficial innovation.
However, it is more likely that the authors of the Constitution simply followed the
English precedent and chose the patent without paying much attention to the subject,
since they were also faced with the larger problems of how to structure the
government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend the new nation.
Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 71 AM. SCl.
500, 500 (1983). It is also possible "that the delegates were tired [and] wanted to go home .
Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 26, 51.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
37.
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (reaffirming that patents are designed to promote "the progress of
useful arts"); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)
("[Tihe primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners
of patents, but is 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . .').
35 U.S.C. § 102 denies patentability to ideas that are already public, while § 103
38.
denies patentability to obvious advances. §§ 102-103 (2006). "Inventions" must be truly inventive
and not merely obvious improvements on existing knowledge. Id. § 103; Graham, 383 U.S. at 6;
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
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the information necessary to make and use the invention. 39 In
contrast, inventors can often profit from their work while keeping the
invention confidential and relying on trade secret protection, 40 rather
than making the invention public.4 1 For example, if an inventor
develops a more efficient process for manufacturing an item, the
inventor may be able to keep the process secret and profit by
undercutting the price of competitors who must use the less efficient,
publicly available process to manufacture the item. 42
Public commercialization can irrevocably surrender a trade
43
Even such paradigmatic trade secrets as the recipe for Coke
secret.
or Kentucky Fried Chicken are subject to discovery by reverse
engineering. 44 Without the protection of patent law, competitors who
learn the secret by proper means 45 can make use of it without having
spent the time and money to develop it. In economic terms, this gives
the competitor an advantage over the innovator in pricing because the
46
competitor does not need to recover research and development costs.

35 U.S.C. § 112 ('The specification shall contain a written description of the
39.
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same... .").
As long as the requirements for trade secrecy (valuable confidential information as
40.
to which reasonable steps are taken to maintain its confidentiality) are met, a trade secret may
be maintained-in theory, indefinitely, but a public disclosure of the trade secret would destroy
it. Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 1(4), 2 (amended 1985).
35 U.S.C. § 112.
41.
Jefferson is frequently cited for his observation that "[h]e who receives an idea from
42.
me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me." Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former US President, to
Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976). 'This
observation was clearly a lapse of economic judgment for the sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade
secret law is that there is economic value in keeping competitors in the dark." Max Stul
Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersectionof Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FIA. L. REV.
229, 236 n.20 (1999).
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (amended 1985). As Thomas Jefferson observed:
43.
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he
property, it is ...
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
every one [sic] ....
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former U.S. President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813)
(available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976).
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. Of course, a competitor who reverse engineered the
44.
formula would still face the task of convincing consumers that it had successfully done so. As of
the date of publication of this Article, the recipes for Coke and Kentucky Fried Chicken remain
protected trade secrets.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act prohibits acquisition by improper means.
45.
Misappropriation may be enjoined or give rise to damages. Id. §§ 2(a), 3(a). Misappropriation is
defined as "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means." Id. § 1(2)(i).
Id. § 3 cmt.
46.

10
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The prospect of a competitor using the same innovation at a lower cost
reduces the incentive to innovate. 4 7
A patent gives its owner the right to prevent competitors from
making, using, selling, or importing the patented invention for a
period starting on the date the USPTO issues the patent,4 8 and ending
twenty years after the date the owner files the patent application. 49
An infringer of these rights is liable for damages that are to be no less
than a reasonable royalty.50 Courts may also enjoin infringements 5 1
and may award attorney fees in certain cases. 52 Thus, by providing
the right to exclude competitors from the use of the innovation for a
limited term, the patent statute may be viewed as an incentive for
innovators to share their ideas. 53
It is important to recognize that "[t]he patent laws attempt to
reconcile this Nation's deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the
need to encourage progress," 54 and that Congress designed the patent
statute to encourage some, but not all, innovation. Congress designed
certain sections of the statute to ensure that what an applicant seeks
to patent is, in fact, innovative and "worth the embarrassment" of
granting a patent.55 Under 35 U.S.C. § 111, patent applications must
be submitted in writing, and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the application
must be detailed enough to demonstrate that the applicant has
possession of enough data to describe the invention and how to make

47.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974).
48.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
49.
Id. § 154(a)(2). Some patent terms are subject to adjustment in certain
circumstances related to delays in processing by the Patent Office. Id. § 154(b).
Id. § 284.
50.
51.
Id. § 283. In eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Court held
that even in patent cases, a court must apply the traditional equitable four-factor test in deciding
whether it is appropriate to issue an injunction. Id. at 391.
52.
35 U.S.C. § 285.
53.
Some inventions lend themselves to commercialization without surrendering trade
secrecy. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 477-78. For example, a machine that makes it cheaper to produce
an end product may be kept as a trade secret while the inventor profits by sale of the end
product. Most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the
protection of trade secret law. See, e.g., id. at 476. Thus, products that reveal the secret are
difficult to commercialize while maintaining trade secrecy, and, for this reason, works of
authorship are often difficult to commercialize while maintaining trade secrecy. Computer
software, however, is a large commercially valuable class of works of authorship that may be
commercialized publicly, protected by copyright and maintained as a trade secret by releasing
executable code only, or by marketing services performed using the software rather than the
software itself. "Cloud computing" utilizes this business model.
54.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966).
55.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former US President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813) (available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbibO2O976); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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and use it.56 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the application must demonstrate
novelty, while 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires non-obviousness.5 7 These
requirements are technology neutral; they apply to any claimed
invention and are not intended to preclude patentability of specific
types of inventions.5 8 In addition to the statute's generally applicable
novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement requirements, Congress
specifically restricted patentability to four categories of statutory
subject matter, and excluded certain types of inventions from
patentability.5 9 The technology-specific statutory exclusions shed
little light on the dividing line between patentable subject matter and
These exclusions share no common
unpatentable discoveries.6 0
theoretical basis-they are simply examples of case-by-case lobbying
power.

B. Evolution of the Statute
The current patent statute sets several hurdles for
patentability. 61 The Federal Circuit views § 101 as a gatekeeper, 62
only
restricting the grant of patents to just four-and
four 63 -categories of invention: processes, machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter. 64
The "statutory subject matter" language of the current statute
is virtually unchanged from that of the first patent statute, enacted in
1790.65 The first patent statute provided for patenting of "any useful
art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement

56.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 111-112.
Id.
57.
Id. § 101.
58.
59.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 111.
13 U.S.C. § 151; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
60.
284 (amending 35 U.S.C.). Although theoretically patentable, medical procedures are, in effect,
not worth patenting as Congress has denied remedies for infringement of such patents. 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c)(1).
As discussed in Part I.A, supra, an invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious
61.
in order to be patentable, and the applicant for a patent must supply a written description of the
invention sufficient to teach others how to make and use it. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112.
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
62.
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding § 101 to be a
threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability); In re Bergy, 596
F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to
patentability is § 101.").
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974) ("No patent is available
63.
for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express
categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101.").
64.
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
65.
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therein not before known or used," 66 if a majority of a board composed
of the Secretary of State (then Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary of
War (then Henry Knox), and the Attorney General (then Edmund
Randolph) considered "the invention or discovery sufficiently useful
and important."6 7
The second patent statute, enacted in 1793,68 explicitly added
the term "composition of matter" to the list of statutory subject
matter. 69 The 1793 definition of "statutory subject matter" remained
unchanged until 1952,70 when Congress amended what would later
become § 101 by replacing the word "art" with "process," and providing
a definition of the term "process" in § 100(b). 7 1 The Supreme Court

66.
Id.
67.
Section 1 of the statute provided:
That upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General of the United States,
setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before
known or used . . . it shall and may be lawful to and for the Secretary of State, the
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if
they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause
letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, to bear test[s] by the
President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said
petition, and describing the said invention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully, and
thereupon granting to such petitioner . . . for any term not exceeding fourteen years,
the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to
others to be used, the said invention or discovery ....
Id. at 109-10.
68.
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318-19 (repealed 1836). "This bill was
probably one written by Thomas Jefferson himself. . . ." P.J. Federico, The Patent Act of 1793,
18 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 77, 77 (SPECIAL ISSUE), (1936). The Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1 (1966) characterizes Jefferson as the "moving spirit" of the patent statute and the
author of the 1793 Act. Id. at 7.
69.
The 1793 statute provided:
That when any person ... being a citizen ... of the United States, shall allege that he
. . . [has] invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a
petition to the Secretary of State, . . . it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary
of State, to cause letters patent to be made out . ...
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-20 (repealed 1836).
Congress amended the patent statute in 1836, but the amendment did not affect the
70.
definition of statutory subject matter. Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. The
1836 amendments were largely directed to eliminating abuses under the 1793 system, which
allowed patents to be issued "without any examination into the merit or novelty of the invention"
thereby producing a large number of patents that were "worthless and void, as conflicting with,
and infringing upon one another, or upon public rights not subject to patent privileges; arising
either from a want of due attention to the specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the
onerous to the courts,
patentees of the state of the arts" and "a great number of lawsuits ...
ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society . . . ." S. REP. 24-239, at 3-4 (1839). The 1836
statute established a Patent Office within the Department of State to review applications to
determine patentability prior to issue. Patent Act of 1836 § 6.
71.
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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has made clear that neither change was substantive. 72 In the most
recent overhaul of the patent statute, Congress left the definition of
"statutory subject" matter unchanged.7 3 Thus, the current statutory
language differs from the original language in only two respects: the
addition of the category "composition of matter" in 1793 and the
change from "art" to "process" in 1952, both of which courts have held
to be non-substantive. 74
C. Evolution of Supreme Court Interpretationof "Statutory Subject
Matter"
While the Congressional definition of "statutory subject
matter" has remained fundamentally constant since the founding of
the Republic, and the Supreme Court has "more than once cautioned
that courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which the legislature has not expressed,"75 the Court has
nevertheless imposed a series of exceptions amounting to judicial
The Court's current
redefinitions of statutory subject matter.76
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) ("[A] process has historically enjoyed
72.
patent protection because it was considered a form of 'art' as that term was used in the 1793
Act.").
America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 14 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C.). The
73.
Act explicitly excluded tax strategy inventions from eligibility by amending the rules for
evaluating prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, and it established a process for reviewing
patentability of business methods, but it did not change the fundamental definition of statutory
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id.
While the 1790 statute did not explicitly include "compositions of matter," this
74.
category was, under English precedent, considered within the term "manufacture." In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring). Processes, though not mentioned in the
1793 statute, were considered patentable subject matter. In Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252
(1854), the Court held that "[a] process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act
of Congress. It is included under the general term 'useful art."' Id. at 267. In Cochrane v. Deener,
94 U.S. 780 (1877), the Court held:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the
instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If
new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of
the patent law, it is an art.
Id. at 787-88. In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881), the Court held, "That a patent can be
granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and
new compositions of matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A
manufacturing process is clearly an art . . . ."Id. at 723. Finally, in Diamond v. Diehr, the 1952
statutory change from "art" to "process" was held to simply modernize the eighteenth-century
term "art" which, in contemporary terminology, would have included processes. 450 U.S. at 175.
"Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a 'process' did not change with the
addition of that term to § 101." Id. at 184.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted).
75.
Alternative justifications have been offered, treating inventions falling within the
76.
exceptions as either "not inventive" or as obvious, on the theory that laws of nature are in the
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definition excludes laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.77 Tracing the path to that definition should prove informative.
1. Scientific Principles
The Court's exploration of the meaning of "statutory subject
matter" began with a series of decisions in the 1850s in which the
Court attempted to draw a distinction between understanding a
scientific principle and finding a use for the principle.78 The Court
concluded that "[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can
claim in either of them an exclusive right [sic]" 7 9 and that "[i]t is for
the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of
producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and
not for the result or effect itself."80
The
Court's application
of the distinction between
understanding a scientific principle and finding a use for the principle
is illustrated in O'Reilly v. Morse,8 1 the 1854 case determining the
patentability of Samuel Morse's invention of the telegraph. Morse had
claimed his invention in several ways: (1) as "a process of using
electromagnetism to produce distinguishable signs for telegraphy"; 82
(2) as a "system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and of dots,
spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences,
substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic
purposes";8 3 and (3) as "the use of the motive power of the electro or
galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed,
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any
distances . . . ."84 The Court found the first two formulations of the
invention patentable and the third unpatentable, distinguishing
between patentable specific uses of electromagnetism and
unpatentable claims to the use of magnetism as a motive power,

public domain, presumably meaning that they were constructively known, although only recently
discovered. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Sarnoff, supra note 19.
Neither can be supported by a testable rationale, see infra note 320, and in any event, whatever
the terminology used, the Court is still rewriting the statute.
77.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
78.
In 1853, as now, the patent statute required that the invention for which a patent
was sought must be "useful." See supra note 65.
79.
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
80.
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854).
81.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854).
82.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. at 111).
83.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84.
Morse, 56 U.S. at 62.
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without specifying how the concept was used. 85 The Court rejected the
third formulation8 6 because it attempted to claim something that
Morse had not invented and could not describe.8 7
The Morse case would yield the same result today, but a court
would likely decide the issue under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires
that an applicant for a patent provide a written description
sufficiently instructing others how to make and use the claimed
invention,88 rather than under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The language in the
89
Court's opinion that Morse "indeed had not invented" could be
stretched to mean that Morse's discovery was not an invention, but
the context better supports a reading that Morse's claim covered
things that Morse had not yet invented. 90
In 1874, the Court declared that "an idea of itself is not
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically
useful is."91 The idea in question was the creation of a small hole in a
92
rubber eraser meant to allow the eraser to fit on the end of a pencil.
The Court observed that "the idea of this patentee was a good one, but

Id. at 112-13.
85.
The third formulation was Claim 8 of the Morse application. Id. at 113. Patent
86.
applicants are allowed to present multiple claims to the same invention for reasons that should
be clear from the Court's decision: although each relates to the same invention, the scope that is
patentable is unknown until the US Patent and Trademark Office has examined the application
and the courts have held it valid. See generally id. Therefore, applicants are encouraged to
present multiple claims: "(a) The specification must conclude with a claim particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention or
discovery. (b) More than one claim may be presented provided they differ substantially from each
other and are not unduly multiplied." 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (2012). The Patent Office recommends:
Many of the difficulties encountered in the prosecution of patent applications after
final rejection may be alleviated if each applicant includes, at the time of filing or no
later than the first reply, claims varying from the broadest to which he or she believes
he or she is entitled to the most detailed that he or she is willing to accept.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 608.01(m)

(8th

ed. rev. 8, 2010).
"In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not
87.
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his
patent. The Court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law." Morse, 56
U.S. at 113.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
88.
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same. . . .").
Morse, 56 U.S. at 113 ("In fine he claims ... [a] process which he has not described
89.
and indeed had not invented.").
In fact, the Court also observed, "For aught that we now know some future inventor,
90.
in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by
means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination
set forth in the plaintiffs specification." Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
91.
Id.
92.
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his device to give it effect, though useful, was not new," and was
therefore not patentable. 93 As the Court construed the claims, all that
the inventor had done was to recognize, as others had before, that, "if
a solid substance was inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber
smaller than itself, the rubber would cling to it."94
The Court noted that this observation of a natural
In the
characteristic of rubber "adds nothing . .. patentable." 9 5
Court's view, "the small opening in the piece of rubber not limited in
form or shape, was not patentable, neither was the elasticity of the
rubber [sic]."96 The Court refused to allow a patent for what it viewed
as "the idea that if a pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber
smaller than itself the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and when
so attached become convenient for use as an eraser . . . ."
Under this view of the claim, the Court would reach the same
result today under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (or § 103).98 Accepting the view
that it was already known that inserting something into a hole in a
piece of rubber is a convenient way to provide an eraser, it is hard to
see the non-obviousness of doing so using a pencil as the "something."
In Tilghman v. Proctor,99 the Court looked to English precedent
to conclude that there was a "true distinction between a mere
principle . . . and a process by which a principle is applied to effect a
useful result."1 00 The Court noted:
That a hot-blast is better than a cold-blast for smelting iron in a furnace was the
principle or scientific fact discovered by Neilson; and yet, being nothing but a principle,
he could not have a patent for that. But having invented and practically exemplified a
process for utilizing this principle, namely, that of heating the blast, in a receptacle,
between the blowing apparatus and the furnace, he was entitled to a patent for that

93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 102 precludes patentability for things that are not new. § 102 (2006).
98.
Arguably, while the eraser and its properties were known, as were pencils and erasers, the
combination would be viewed as a new combination, but even under this view, § 103 would likely
bar patentability today. That section provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of [35 U.S.C.], if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id. § 103. Section 103 was not added to the statute until 1952. Id. (originally enacted as Patent
Act of 1952, July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792, 792). However, by 1874 the principle that
would be codified in § 103 had been recognized by the Supreme Court. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. 248, 257 (1851).
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
99.
Id. at 724.
100.
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process . ...
Another person might invent a better apparatus for applying the
process ... .101

Showing that even the highest court in the land has no
particular insight into the future, the Court opined,
It seems to us that this clear and exact summary of the law affords the key to almost
every case that can arise . . . . Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be
produced in any art by the use of certain means is entitled to a patent for it, provided he
[Ilt is enough, in the patent, to point out the process to be
specifies the means ....
performed, without giving supererogatory directions as to the apparatus or method to be
employed. If the mode of applying the process is not obvious, then a description of a
particular mode by which it may be applied is sufficient . . . . Perhaps the process is
susceptible of being applied in many modes and by the use of many forms of apparatus.
But he must describe some
The inventor is not bound to describe them all . . ..
particular mode, or some apparatus, by which the process can be applied .... 102

A modern court thus could resolve the case comfortably under
35 U.S.C. § 112; having shown one way to carry out a process
embodying a chemical principle, the Court held that the inventor was
entitled to a patent covering the process, regardless of the
mechanisms that might be used to carry out the process. 103
In 1891, the Court continued the effort to define patentable
subject matter, this time by defining the concept of "invention."1 04 The
Court concluded, "[t]he truth is the word ["invention"] cannot be
defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the
inventive faculty or not."1 05
101.
Id. at 724-25.
102.
Id. at 728-29.
103.
Id. at 709-10.
Interestingly, the term "invention" has never been defined in a US patent statute.
104.
The current statute includes "invention" in the list of definitions, but the definition is "invention
or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2006).
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891). The Court went on to note:
105.
What shall be construed as invention within the meaning of the patent laws has been
made the subject of a great amount of discussion . . . . By some, "invention" is
described as the contriving or constructing of that which had not before existed; and
by another, giving a construction to the patent law, as "the finding out, contriving,
devising or creating something new and useful, which did not exist before, by an
operation of the intellect." To say that the act of invention is the production of
something new and useful does not solve the difficulty of giving an accurate definition,
since the question of what is new, as distinguished from that which is a colorable
variation of what is old, is usually the very question in issue. To say that it involves
an operation of the intellect, is a product of intuition, or of something akin to genius,
as distinguished from mere mechanical skill, draws one somewhat nearer to an
appreciation of the true distinction, but it does not adequately express the idea. The
truth is, the word cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty
or not. In a given case we may be able to say that there is present invention of a very
high order. In another we can see that there is lacking that impalpable something
which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill. Courts, adopting fixed
principles as a guide, have by a process of exclusion determined that certain
variations in old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the variation
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In 1933, the Court tangentially addressed patentable subject
matter in a case involving ownership of an invention developed by a
government employee outside the scope of his employment.1 0 6 The
Court rejected a theory that would imply an assignment from
employees to employers, in part because of the difficulty of identifying
the point at which invention took place.10 7 The Court observed, "the
act of invention ... consists neither in finding out the laws of nature,
nor in fruitful research as to the operation of natural laws, but in
discovering how those laws may be utilized or applied for some
beneficial purpose, by a process, a device or a machine."10 8
In 1939, the Court, in dictum, made a subtle change in
language, which in retrospect marked a significant change in
philosophy. In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 09 the parties asked the Court to construe a claim for a radio
antenna produced according to a previously known formula for
calculating optimum configuration.1 10
The Court held that the
accused device did not infringe the claimed invention.'1 1 In construing
the claim, the trial court viewed the invention as the relationship of
components determined by a formula that was disclosed in the
specifications.11 2 A third party had developed the formula, which had
been published in a scientific journal years earlier.113 Nevertheless,
the Court assumed that the patent claim covered an invention and

relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a
question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition.
Id. at 426-27.
106.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 182 (1933).
107.
Id. at 187-88.
108.
Id. at 188 ("The reluctance of courts to imply or infer an agreement by the employee
to assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of the act of invention, which
consists neither in finding out the laws of nature, nor in fruitful research as to the operation of
natural laws, but in discovering how those laws may be utilized or applied for some beneficial
purpose, by a process, a device, or a machine. It is the result of an inventive act, the birth of an
idea and its reduction to practice; the product of original thought; a concept demonstrated to be
true by practical application or embodiment in tangible form.").
109.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
110.
Id. at 98-99.
111.
Id. at 102.
112.
Id. at 92.
113.
Id. at 93-94 ("Carter did not invent the formula. It had been developed by Abraham
and published in a scientific journal thirty years before. . . . Abraham's formula expressed the
scientific truth that when radio activity is projected from a charged wire of finite length, i.e., one
having standing waves, and having a length of a multiple of half wave lengths, the angle
between the direction of the principal radio activity and the wire is dependent on wave length
and wire length, which is a multiple of half wave lengths. . . . It is plain, therefore, that the
Carter invention, if it was invention, consisted in taking the angle of the Abraham formula as the
angle between each wire of the V antenna and its bisector." (emphasis added)).
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was valid, 1 14 and stated in dictum 1 5 that "[w]hile a scientific truth, or
the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth
may be."116

While irrelevant to the resolution of the case before the Court,
and supported by no citation of authority, this language marked a
shift from earlier statutory-subject-matter cases. Tilghman required
only that an applicant provide one practical process for using a
scientific principle, whereas the dictum in Mackay laid the foundation
for the Court's first general exclusion from patentable statutory
subject matter: scientific principles.'
2. Laws of Nature
The second exception to patentable statutory subject matter,
laws of nature, emerged from the 1948 case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant.118 The technology at issue involved the application of
root nodule bacteria to certain field crops to increase yield. 1 9 Prior to
the "invention," farmers used several different types of bacterial
inoculants depending on the type of crop. 120 Inoculant manufacturers
believed farmers needed to apply each inoculant independently
The "invention" claimed a
because of mutual inhibition.121
combination of several inoculants, which the applicant had found
could efficiently coexist.1 22 In holding the invention unpatentable, the
Court announced another exception to the statutory language in
35 U.S.C. § 101, choosing expansive language when (as a dissenting
opinion points out) a much narrower ground of decision was
available. 123 The majority held that the combination of naturally
occurring inoculants was a product of nature, even though the Court
cited no evidence that the combination naturally occurred together,

Id. at 94 ("We assume, without deciding the point, that this advance was invention
114.
even though it was achieved by the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type
of antenna.").
The issue would arise if the accused device had been covered by the claim and if the
115.
applicant had invented the formula rather than adapted a previously published formula. In that
case, there would be infringement unless the claim were invalid, and patentability could not be
defeated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, so it would be necessary to reach the 35 U.S.C. § 101 issue.
Mackay, 306 U.S. at 94.
116.
Compare id., with Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1881).
117.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
118.
119.
Id. at 131.
120.
Id. at 129-30.
Id.
121.
122.
Id. at 130.
123.
Id. at 137 (Burton, J., dissenting).
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much less in combination in a bag.1 2 4 The Court held that "[h]e who
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end." 1 2 5 The Court found that the
"invention" did not constitute an advancement over what already
existed in nature:
Each of the species of root nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same
group of leguminous plants which it always infected. No species acquires a different
use. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species
of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same
effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in
combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the
ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the
patentee.126

The Court drew a distinction between discovering a law of
nature and applying it:
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a
hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the
12 7
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.

The conclusion that "manifestations of laws of nature" were
"free to all men" (i.e., not patentable subject matter) established the
second Supreme Court exception to the statutory language of § 101.128
Although he concurred in the result, the rationale troubled
Justice Frankfurter:
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as "the work of nature" and
the "laws of nature." For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much
ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed "the work of
nature," and any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties "the laws of
nature."

12 9

Instead, Justice Frankfurter preferred to decide the case on a
basis that did not require limiting Congress's statutory language:
since "the strains that Bond put together in the product which he
patented can be specified only by the properties of the mixture," the
application would not satisfy the disclosure requirements (now found

124. . Id. at 130.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 131.
127.
Id. at 130.
128.
The statutory section at issue in Funk Bros. was
statute as revised in 1952. Id. at 132.
129.
Id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

§

31, comparable to

§

101 of the
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in 35 U.S.C. § 112), and therefore the same decision could be reached
without creating a new exception to

§ 101.130

3. Abstract Ideas
In 1972, the Court established the "abstract ideas" exception to
patentable statutory subject matter when it faced a patent application
that claimed a process for converting numbers from binary-coded
decimal format to the binary format used by digital computers. 131 The
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson held that a claim to a
computer-implemented method of converting numbers was not an
invention under § 101.132 Because the method had "no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer," it
was not limited to a specific use and therefore amounted to nothing
more than an unpatentable mathematical algorithm. 133 The Court
stated that such a mathematical formula was simply an abstract idea,
akin to unpatentable phenomena of nature and abstract concepts.13 4
The Court then summarized, "[p]henomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work." 135 Under this theory, the problem with allowing a
patent on the invention was that it "wholly pre-empts" the use of a
mathematical formula and therefore was not patentable subject
matter. 136 The Court recognized an alternative ground for reaching
the same result (without requiring alteration of the statutory
interpretation), describing the claimed mathematical process as "so
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of
the BCD to pure binary conversion." 1 37 Since Morse precludes a

130.
Id. at 134. The patent claimed "An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a
plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus
Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen
in the leguminous plant for which they are specific." U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 (filed Aug. 23,
1939). 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires an applicant to provide
a written description of the same, and of the manner and process of making and using
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use
the same ....
§ 112 (2006).
131.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
132.
Id. at 71-72.
Id.
133.
134.
Id. at 67.
135.
Id.
136.
See id. at 71-72.
137.
Id. at 68.
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patentee from claiming more than he has actually invented, 138 such an
overly broad claim could be found unpatentable without the need to
construe

§ 101.139

In Dann v. Johnston, the Court had the opportunity to
invalidate a patent under its newly formulated interpretation of
35 U.S.C. § 101, but chose instead the less invasive route of finding
the claim obvious, and therefore unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §
103.140 The invention at issue was claimed as a "machine system for
automatic record-keeping of bank checks and deposits." 14 1 The system
allowed bank customers to write category codes on deposit slips and
checks, which the bank would then encode using magnetic ink when
the items cleared, allowing the codes to be electronically stored and
tabulated by data processors so that the bank could provide the
customer with a summary, subtotaled by category. 142 Following a
lengthy process within the Patent Office, 143 the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals held that the invention was a "record-keeping machine
system," which was "clearly within the 'technological arts,"' and
therefore statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.144 The
Supreme Court invalidated the patent, but avoided the statutory
subject matter issue by holding the invention obvious under 35 U.S.C.

§

103.145

In Parker v. Flook, the Court clarified that a "process is not
unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature." 146 The
patent at issue included claims to a catalytic conversion process that
involved the use of a formula, which the Court assumed to be novel
and useful, to calculate and update "alarm limits." 14 7 Drawing on the
formulation of Benson, the Court explained that determining whether
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854).
138.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); In re Dowdall, 315 F.2d 929, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
139.
140.
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976) ("Petitioner and respondent, as well as
various amici, have presented lengthy arguments addressed to the question of the general
patentability of computer programs. . . . We find no need to treat that question in this case,
however, because we conclude that in any event respondent's system is unpatentable on grounds
of obviousness." (citation omitted)).
141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 221-22.
The examiner rejected the claims for lack of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and as
143.
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 223. Upon appeal, the Patent Office's internal review
board rejected the claims on a different theory, considering them beyond the field of technology
and therefore not statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. The Patent Office also
rejected the claims on grounds of obviousness, rendering the claims unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103. Id.
144.
Id. at 223-24.
145.
Id. at 225.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
146.
147.
Id. at 586-87.
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a claim containing a mathematical algorithm is statutory subject
matter is not simply a matter of whether the claim "wholly pre-empts"
the mathematical algorithm, but whether "once that algorithm is
assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a
whole, contains no patentable invention." 148 Noting an "unclear line"
between an abstract principle and the application of that principle, 149
the Court concluded that the process was not statutory subject matter
under § 101 since it was merely a mathematical formula, which was
"not the kind of 'discover[y]' that the statute was enacted to
protect."15 0
Subsequently, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court explained its
decision in Flook: the patent application did not "contain any
disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring
of the process variables, nor the means of setting off an alarm or
adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a formula for
computing an updated alarm limit."15 1

This interpretation suggests

that the decision in Flook does not implicate statutory subject matter
at all, but rather is a straightforward application of the
disclosure/enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.152
The fate of the biotechnology industry hung in the balance in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, as the application for a patent on the
invention of a genetically modified bacterium worked its way through
the courts. 153 As Chief Justice Burger framed the issue before the
Supreme Court, "We granted certiorari to determine whether a live,
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101."154 The fundamental discovery described in the patent

application was that a bacterium could be genetically modified to give
it a new property: the ability to digest oil spills.15 5

The application

148.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 589.
149.
Id. at 593; see supra note 9.
150.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186-87 (1981) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 586)
151.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The statute's requirements entail:
152.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
See Dan L. Burk, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Prof. of Law, Univ. of Minn.,
153.
Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture: Tailoring Patent Policy to Specific Industries
(Apr. 10, 2003), in 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2003).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
154.
Chakrabarty had inserted plasmids into Pseudomonas bacteria, which gave the
155.
bacteria a new property, the ability to break down multiple components of crude oil, a property
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sought to claim the invention in three ways: (1) the method for
producing the modified bacteria (a process), (2) the modified bacteria
mixed with a carrier that would float on water (a composition of
matter), and (3) the bacteria themselves. 15 6 The patent examiner
granted the first two categories of claims, but rejected claims to the
bacteria themselves because they were "products of nature," and living
things were unpatentable per se.' 5 7
The Patent Office's internal review board overruled the
examiner's "product of nature" rejection, concluding that genetically
modified bacteria did not occur naturally; it affirmed the rejection per
the "living things" rationale. 15 8 The appellate court reversed, holding
the claims to the organism to be patentable. 159 In 1980, the Supreme
Court viewed the issue as "a narrow one of statutory interpretation
requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101," and began the analysis by
repeating its caution from Dubilier, that courts "should not read into
the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has
not expressed."1 60 The Court reviewed the legislative history of the
1952 Patent Act,1 6 1 and concluded that "[i]n choosing such expansive
terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the
comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent
laws would be given wide scope." 16 2 Thus, the Court held that the
bacterium, although living, was patentable subject matter. 163
Having disposed of the case before it, the Court then went on to
consolidate the current judicial interpretation of the limits on
statutory subject matter:
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not

"which is possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria" and "believed to have significant value
for the treatment of oil spills." See id.
156.
Id. at 305-06.
157.
Id. at 306.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. The route to the Court was convoluted, involving two petitions for certiorari and
a remand for reconsideration. Id. at 306-07.
160.
Id. at 307-08 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199
(1933)).
Id. at 308-09. The Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Act included a
161.
statement that "a person may have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may include
anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled." S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The Court interpreted the language as "inform[ing] us that Congress
intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."'
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923).
162.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
163.
Id. at 310.
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patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
2
Such discoveries are
E=mc , nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
64
"manifestations of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."1

The Court thus created three broad exceptions to the statutory
language, while concluding that Congress intended to give patents a
wide scope and reminding the lower courts that "our obligation is to
take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the
legislative history and statutory purpose."1 6 5
4. Patentable Subject Matter After Chakrabarty
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court reiterated that "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" were not patentable.1 66
Furthermore, "while a claim drawn to a fundamental principle is
unpatentable, 'an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.""6 7 The Court then affirmed the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals' decision, which had overruled the Patent Office's
Benson-based rejection.166 The applicant had claimed an improvement
in making molded rubber products, which involved monitoring the
temperature inside the mold and using a well-known equation to
calculate the required cure time based on the measured
temperature.1 69

Id. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
164.
(1948)) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972);
O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853)).
Id. at 313, 315.
165.
166.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187-88).
167.
Id. at 180-81.
168.
Id. at 187. The first claim provided:
169.
A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with
the aid of a digital computer, comprising: providing said computer with a data base for
said press including at least, natural logarithm conversion data (In), the activation
energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and a
constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for
monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, constantly determining the temperature
(Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during
molding, constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z), repetitively
calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius
equation for reaction time during the cure, which is In v = CZ + x where v is the total
required cure time, repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals
during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with
the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and opening the press automatically
when a said comparison indicates equivalence.
Id. at 179 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Patent Office rejected the claim as not falling within
statutorily acceptable subject matter. 170 The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals reversed, holding that a claim is not nonstatutory per
se simply because a computer is involved. 171 While reiterating that an
algorithm or mathematical formula is like a law of nature, which
cannot be the subject of a patent, the Supreme Court held that the
claim was not an attempt to patent a mathematical formula but
rather "a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly
employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to
pre-empt the use of that equation." 172
The Court traced the
development of its rule for determining whether a process was
statutory subject matter, noting that in Benson the Court "repeated
the .

.

. definition

recited

in

Cochrane

v.

Deener,

adding:

'Transformation and reduction of an article "to a different state or
thing" is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
173
include particular machines."'
The Court declined an opportunity to clarify application of the
"natural phenomenon" exception in Laboratory Corp. of America v.
Metabolite Laboratories,Inc.17 4 The patent at issue claimed a process
for diagnosing vitamin deficiency by correlating the level of a
compound in blood with the deficiency.17 5 The district court upheld a
jury verdict that the patent was valid and infringed, the Federal
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the claim was invalid as an attempt to "claim a
monopoly over a basic scientific relationship." 17 6 The Court, however,

170.
Id. at 179.
171.
Id. at 181.
172.
Id. at 187. The Court stated:
We have before us today only the question of whether respondents' claims fall within
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents'
claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula. . . . [W]hen a claim containing a
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process
which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws
were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101. Because we do not view
respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be
drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products, we affirm ....
Id. at 191-93.
173.
Id. at 184.
174.
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (Labcorp), 548 U.S. 124,
125-26 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175.
Id. at 129. The patent claimed "A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or
folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated
level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176.
Id. at 132.

2012]

PATENTS 101

27

dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, with three justices
dissenting.177

In 2010, the Court presented a clear summary of its
then-current interpretation of the language of § 101 in Bilski v.
The patent application at issue claimed a
Kappos.178
computer-implemented system that employed a mathematical formula
for hedging risk. 179 The Patent Office and lower courts all held the
claims were not valid statutory subject matter. 180 In affirming, the
Court summarized:
Section 101 specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are
. "Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
patent eligible
The Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101's
wide scope . . .
broad principles: "laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas." While not
required by the statutory text, these exceptions are consistent with the notion that a
patentable process must be "new and useful." And in any case, the exceptions have
18
defined the statute's reach as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150years. 1

The Court took the opportunity to remind the Federal Circuit
that it had provided no bright-line test for patentability:
1 82
is not the sole test for patent eligibility under
The machine-or-transformation test
§ 101. The Court's precedents establish that although that test may be a useful and
important clue or investigative tool, it is not the sole test for deciding whether an
invention is a patent-eligible "process" under § 101. In holding to the contrary, the
Federal Circuit violated two principles of statutory interpretation: Courts "should not
read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
will be interpreted as taking their
expressed," and "[u]nless otherwise defined,18'words
3
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."'

Finally, in March, 2012, the Court answered the question it
had thought premature in 2010. In Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,1 84 although noting that "too broad an
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent
law" because "all inventions at some level embody ... laws of nature,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,"185 a unanimous Court
reiterated the exclusions from statutory subject matter, stating that
"'laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas' are not

177.
Id. at 125.
See 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
178.
179.
Id. at 3220.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 3221 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 308, 309 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This is the test the Federal Circuit had applied, id., relying on language in Diamond
182.
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981).
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221 (citation omitted) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183).
183.
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
184.
Id. at 1293.
185.
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patentable."1 86 In Mayo, the inventor had discovered the precise
correlation between the level of a drug metabolite in a patient's blood
and the efficacy of the dose of the drug the patient was taking.18 7 A
representative claim to the method of optimizing the drug dosage
required administering the drug, measuring the level of the
metabolite in the patient, and decreasing or increasing the dosage
depending on whether the metabolite level was above or below a
specified trigger level.188
Echoing the concerns over monopolization of a law of nature
voiced in dissent in Labcorp, Justice Breyer, now writing for a
unanimous court, held that the claim amounted to no more than
informing a "relevant audience about certain laws of nature" followed
by "conventional activity" and was unpatentable.1 89
Summarizing the Court's holdings, "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable subject matter.19 0
"A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; . . . these cannot

be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right." 191 These categories are unpatentable because they are "part of
the storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none." 192 The Court's explanations of this conclusion
reduce to this simple tautology: laws of nature are not patentable
because no one may possess the exclusive right to them that would be
granted by a patent. 193
D. FederalCircuitApplications-A Struggle to Keep Up
The history of the development of the judicial exceptions to the
language of § 101 would not be complete without a brief review of the
efforts of the Federal Circuit and its predecessors to implement the
rules announced by the Supreme Court. 194
Id. at 1290 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
186.
Id. at 1294-95.
187.
188.
Id. at 1295.
189.
Id. at 1298.
190.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
191.
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
192.
193.
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Funk
Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175.
Since October 1, 1982, all appeals of patentability decisions have gone to the Court
194.
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). The Federal Circuit is therefore the
principal interpreter of Supreme Court decisions in the field. Cf. id. The cases appear to evidence
an attempt by the Federal Circuit to offer simple, bright-line tests for determining patentable
subject matter, met at every turn by a reminder from the Supreme Court that there are no
shortcuts, only broad principles. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court itself has conceded that the "line between a
patentable process and an unpatentable principle is not always
clear."19 5 In an effort to apply the general rules announced by the
Court to specific cases and to provide some degree of guidance and
predictability, the lower courts have announced, and then abandoned,
a series of shortcut tests for dividing unpatentable subject matter from
patentable subject matter. 196
As the appeals courts attempt to understand the Court's
guidance, a sense of frustration over the seeming impossibility of
implementing such guidance in practice surfaces,19 7 raising the
question of whether a standard which the courts can neither
understand nor implement can be good law.
In a concurring opinion in Arrhythmia Research Technology,
Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., Judge Rader agreed with the majority's
determination of patentability, but stated, "Rather than perpetuate a
non-statutory standard, I would find that the subject matter of the
98
In
'459 patent satisfies the statutory standards of the Patent Act."s

In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit observed:
The Supreme Court has not been clear ... as to whether such subject matter is excluded
from the scope of § 101 because it represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract ideas. The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind of
mathematical subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme Court has used,
among others, the terms "mathematical algorithm," "mathematical formula," and
"mathematical equation" to describe types of mathematical subject matter not entitled
to patent protection standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any
consistent or clear explanation of what it intended by such terms or how these terms are
related, if at all. 19 9

195.
Flook, 437 U.S. at 589. See also Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Labcorp:
I concede that the category of non patentable "(plhenomena of nature," like the
categories of "mental processes" and "abstract intellectual concepts," is not easy to
define. After all, many a patentable invention rests upon its inventor's knowledge of
natural phenomena; many "process" patents seek to make abstract intellectual
concepts workably concrete; and all conscious human action involves a mental process.
548 U.S. 124, 134 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
E.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1062 (Fed. Cir.
196.
1992) (Rader, J., concurring) ("In the wake of Benson, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
struggled to implement the algorithm rule. Much of the difficulty sprang from the obscurity of
the terms invoked to preclude patentability-terms like 'law of nature,' 'natural phenomena,'
'formulae,' or 'algorithm."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 65)).
197.
Commentators have also misapprehended the Court's commands. Perhaps overly
optimistically, A. Samuel Oddi concluded in 2006 that "[w]hat has become apparent is that § 101
patentable subject matter, after Chakrabarty, Diehr, and State Street, is no longer a significant
impediment to patentability." A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory
Subject Matter, 46 IDEA 491, 557 (2006).
198.
958 F.2d at 1061 (Rader, J., concurring).
33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit is
199.
not alone in its confusion as to how to apply the Supreme Court tests. While concurring in the
result in Bilski, Justice Stevens observed that the majority had failed to explain how it reached
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The Federal Circuit's confusion is understandable. As will be
seen, later efforts by the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of the
exclusions were not completely successful.
1. The "Mental Steps" and "Function of a Machine" Exceptions
The dissent in Diehr summarized several early attempts by the
appellate courts to formulate a coherent jurisprudence consistent with
the Supreme Court's theory of exceptions to the statutory language
first articulated in Corning v. Burden: "[It] is well settled that a man
cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine,
The Court
but only for the machine which produces it."200
subsequently reaffirmed the doctrine on several occasions." 201
However, when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals abandoned
the function-of-a-machine exception in In re Tarczy-Hornoch,202 it
held that the doctrine was contrary to "the basic purposes of the
patent system and productive of a range of undesirable results from
the harshly inequitable to the silly." 20 3
Drawing from the Corning language, appellate courts also
concluded that mental operations were unpatentable per se, 2 04 "based
upon the familiar principle that a scientific concept or mere idea
cannot be the subject of a valid patent." 205 Courts applied the mental
steps doctrine inconsistently, 2 06 and in In re Prater, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals abandoned the doctrine, holding that the
mere fact that a process could be performed mentally did not preclude
patentability if the process could also be performed without mental
processes. 207
the conclusion that the claims at issue were abstract ideas. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
200.
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854).
201.
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909); Busch v. Jones, 184 U.S.
598, 607 (1902); Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 554-57 (1898); Risdon
Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 78-79, 84 (1895).
202.
In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 866-67 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
203.
Id. at 867.
In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380-83 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Heritage, 150
204.
F.2d 554, 556-58 (C.C.P.A. 1945).
205.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206.
Kevin Collins, PropertizingThought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 355 (2007).
207.
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superseded by 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969). The court confirmed the abandonment of the mental steps exception in In re
Musgrave, when it stated:
We cannot agree with the board that these claims (all the steps of which can be
carried out by the disclosed apparatus) are directed to non-statutory processes merely
because some or all the steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the
human mind or because it may be necessary for one performing the processes to think.
431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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2. The Technological-Arts Requirement
In In re Musgrave, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held that a process was statutory subject matter if it was within the
"technological arts," 2 08 and in 1970, the court in In re Benson held that
the presence of a general-purpose computer in a process placed it
within the technological arts.209 The Supreme Court rejected the
technological-arts test in Benson. 210 Subsequently, the Federal Circuit
(successor to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) reasoned that
"[tlhe fact that a nonstatutory method is carried out on a programmed
computer does not make the process claim statutory. "211
3. The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test
The Freeman-Walter-Abele test, developed in a trio of cases, 212
required a two-step review of claims. 213 First, courts were to ascertain
whether the claim involved a mathematical algorithm. 214 If so, the
courts had to determine whether the algorithm was applied to
"physical elements or process steps." 2 1 5

Applying this test in Abele, the court held that a claim
involving an algorithm to evaluate data from a CAT scan was
statutory subject matter because the algorithm influenced
"production, detection, and display steps as manifestly statutory
subject matter." 2 16
AT&T v. Excel Communications involved a patent issued for an
addition of a field in a telephone billing record that identified the
long-distance carriers of the parties on either end of the phone line
and allowed differential billing by using Boolean logic to determine if
the carriers were the same. 2 17 The district court held that "the claims
208.
In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893.
209.
In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschal k v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
210.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 72.
211.
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
212.
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 76 7-68
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
213.
In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
Id.
214.
In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905-07.
215.
216.
Id. at 908.
217.
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The first
claim provided:
A method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls
initiated by each subscriber are automatically routed over the facilities of a particular
one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated with that subscriber, said
method comprising the steps of: generating a message record for an interexchange call
between an originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and including, in
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. and thus fall within

the judicially created 'mathematical algorithm' exception to statutory
subject matter." 218
In evaluating the application of the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test to the claims, the Federal Circuit
concluded that "[w]hatever may be left of the earlier test, if anything,
this type of physical limitations analysis seems of little value." 2 19 In
In re Bilski, however, the Federal Circuit again concluded that the
Freeman-Walter-Abele
test
was
inadequate
and
"the
machine-or-transformation
test is
the
applicable
test for
patent-eligible subject matter." 220
4. The "Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Result" Test
In In Re Alappat, the inventor had used an algorithm to
smooth the appearance of oscilloscope waveforms by varying the
intensity of displayed pixels as a function of the distance of the pixel
from the actual waveform. 221 The examiner rejected the claims as
nonstatutory. 222 The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the rejection,
reasoning that, "when the claim is viewed without the steps of this
mathematical algorithm, no other elements or steps are found." 223
Therefore, the claim did not describe a machine, and it fell within the
judicially created exception that precluded patenting "mathematical
algorithms." 224 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that, although
the claim involved a formula, it was directed to a machine. 225 "[T]he
proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical subject
matter exception to § 101 alleged herein is to see whether the claimed
subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical
concept. . . ."226
The Federal Circuit held: "That is not the case
here.... This is not a disembodied mathematical concept. . . , but
said message record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value
which is a function of whether or not the interexchange carrier associated with said
terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said interexchange carriers.
Id. at 1354.
218.
Id. at 1355-56.
219.
Id. at 1359.
220.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd, sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Although the Court affirmed the result, it noted that the
machine-or-transformation test was but one of several ways of testing patentability and was not
necessarily a requirement for patentable subject matter. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258.
221.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
222.
Id. at 1531.
223.
Exparte Alappat, No. 1991-1277, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1346 (B.P.A.I. May 12,
1992).
224.
Id. at 1344.
225.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540-41.
226.
Id. at 1544.
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rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible
result." 227

In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. SignatureFinancialGroup,
Inc., the Federal Circuit applied the useful, concrete, and tangible
result test to an invention for managing a series of financial accounts
using a series of calculations. 22 8 The court found that:
[T]he transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a
practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it
produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result"-a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades. 2 2 9

Thus, the invention satisfied the statutory-subject-matter
requirement. 230 Commenting on the decision in a non-binding opinion,
Justice Breyer, in Labcorp, observed, "[T]he Federal Circuit's decision
in State Street Bank .. . does say that a process is patentable if it
produces a 'useful, concrete and tangible result.' But this Court has
never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement
would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary." 231
Justice Breyer offered the decisions in Morse, Benson, and Flook as
examples of such instances. 232
5. The Machine-or-Transformation Test
In In re Ferguson, the Federal Circuit applied the
machine-or-transformation test to affirm the denial of a patent under
§ 101.233 The application claimed a method for marketing. 234 The
Patent Office's internal board of appeals rejected the claim as an
227.
Id.
228.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
229.
Id. at 1373.
230.
Id.
231.
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136-37 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
232.
Id.
233.
In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
234.
The court noted the claim consisted of:
A method of marketing a product, comprising: developing a shared marketing force,
said shared marketing force including at least marketing channels, which enable
marketing a number of related products; using said shared marketing force to market
a plurality of different products that are made by a plurality of different autonomous
producing company, so that different autonomous companies, having different
ownerships, respectively produce said related products; obtaining a share of total
profits from each of said plurality of different autonomous producing companies in
return for said using; and obtaining an exclusive right to market each of said plurality
of products in return for said using.
Id. at 1361.

34

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:1:1

"abstract idea," and therefore not statutory subject matter.23 5 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the board's denial, applying the
machine-or-transformation test, and concluding Applicant's method
claims did not meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation
test. 236

Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services
involved claims similar to those presented in Labcorp, and the Federal
Circuit again applied its machine-or-transformation test.2 37 The
patent claimed methods for calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine
drugs by administering a drug, then determining the levels of the
drug's metabolites in the patient and comparing them to
pre-determined metabolite levels, "wherein" the measured metabolite
levels would indicate a need to increase or decrease the level of drug to
be administered, so as to minimize toxicity and maximize efficacy of
treatment. 238 Mayo contended that the patent claimed natural
phenomena-the correlations between metabolite levels and efficacy
and toxicity-and wholly preempted the use of natural phenomena. 239
The district court granted Mayo's motion for summary judgment of
invalidity under § 101, but the Federal Circuit reversed. 240
The Federal Circuit, believing it was "following the Supreme
Court," applied the Bilski "definitive test" for determining whether a
process is patent-eligible under § 101: "A claimed process is surely
patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different
state or thing." 24 1 Applying the test, the court concluded that the
method transformed an article: "[t]he transformation is of the human
body following administration of a drug and the various chemical and

235.
Id. at 1362.
236.
In reaching its conclusion the court noted:
Applicants' method claims are not tied to any concrete parts, devices, or combination
of devices. Nor do Applicants' methods, as claimed, transform any article into a
different state or thing. . . . [A]s this court stated in Bilski, "[p]urported
transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or
relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because
they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of
physical objects or substances."
Id. at 1363-64 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
237.
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543
(2010).
238.
Id. at 1339-40.
239.
Id. at 1340-41.
240.
Id. at 1340-41, 1350.
Id. at 1343 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal
241.
quotation marks omitted).
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physical changes of the drug's metabolites that enable their
concentrations to be determined." 242
As illustrated above, the Federal Circuit has attempted, with
limited success and notable frustration, to translate the Supreme
Court's statements regarding exceptions to the statutory definition of
subject matter into practice. Its latest attempt in August of 2012
suggests that there is still an imperfect understanding between the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. In Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. US Patent & Trademark Office, 243 the Federal Circuit
reconsidered the decision which the Supreme Court had vacated and
remanded in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.244
While acknowledging the Supreme Court's definition of patentable
subject matter 245 and the rationale behind the definition, 246 the
Federal Circuit reaffirmed the same decision (by the same vote) that
had been vacated and remanded. 247 On the issue of the patentability
of isolated gene sequences as compositions of matter, the Federal
Circuit held that the claimed isolated DNA sequence covered
suitable
expressly
authorized as
"compositions of matter,
patent-eligible subject matter in § 101."248 Noting that full resolution
of the issue under the Supreme Court definition also depended on
whether the appellee claimed "patent-ineligible products of nature,"
the Federal Circuit concluded the appellee did not, holding, "[t]he
isolated DNA molecules before us are not found in nature." 249 The

242.
Id. at 1346.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
243.
Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12-398).
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
244.
245.
On rehearing, the Federal Circuit stated:
The Supreme Court, however, has . . . consistently held that § 101, although broad, is
not unlimited. The Court's precedents provide three judicially created exceptions to
§ 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: "Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas" are not patentable. The Court has also referred to those exceptions as
precluding the patenting of mental processes.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1324 (citations omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
246.
The Federal Circuit Court utilized the Supreme Court's definition when it stated,
'[t]he relevant distinction for purposes of § 101 is . . . between products of nature . . . and
human-made inventions."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrbarty, 447 U.S.
303, 313 (1980)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit stated, "[t]he Court has explained that,
although not required by the statutory text, '[t]he concepts covered by these exceptions are "part
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.""'
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
The Federal Circuit also reached the same result as to patentability of the claimed
247.
processes, holding those which resulted in a transformed compound patentable and those which
merely required observing a correlation not. Id. at 1333-34.
248.
Id. at 1325.
Id.
249.
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court then devoted a significant amount of effort explaining the
differences between the claimed isolated sequence and the naturally
occurring sequence. 250
The dissent read the Supreme Court's decision as compelling
the conclusion that "[j]ust as a patent involving a law of nature must
have an 'inventive concept' that does 'significantly more than simply
describe . . . natural relations,' a patent involving a product of nature
should have an inventive concept that involves more than merely
incidental changes to the naturally occurring product." 25 1 The dissent
also criticized the majority's decision as granting overly broad
protection, and thereby threatening to foreclose more innovation than
is justified under the statute. 252
At a minimum, the opinions on remand demonstrate that the
Supreme Court's current subject-matter test is not sufficiently clear to
the Federal Circuit to produce a unanimous opinion in a case that the
Supreme Court had just itself decided by a unanimous opinion. This
is not merely an academic "discussion" between the courts. On the
contrary; the uncertainty as to what can be protected and what cannot
has an impact on investment decisions, and therefore has a
corresponding impact on decisions as to which technologies are
This
investigated and developed and which remain unexplored.
uncertainty and its results might be an acceptable cost to society if
there were a countervailing benefit to society. It is therefore fair to
ask why the courts perceive a need to intervene on the definition of
statutory subject matter, and whether these perceived needs establish
such a benefit.
The remainder of the Article will explore both the judiciary's
substantive motivation behind such intervention-that is, whether
and to what extent the courts truly believe some government actor
should make a change-and whether the judiciary is the proper
branch of government to do so.

250.
Id. at 1325-33.
Id. at 1355 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
251.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294, 1297 (2012)).
The dissent does not think Myriad deserves such broad protection. Id. at 1356
252.
(Bryson, J., dissenting) (considering 'how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the
contribution of the inventor' and warning of the 'danger' that overly broad patent claims might
'foreclose|] more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify"'
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1301, 1303
(2012))).
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II. WHY JUDICIAL INTEREST IN STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER?

As discussed above, 253 Congress has both the power and a
rational basis for deciding that it is appropriate to limit patent
In dividing the
protection to certain categories of invention.
patentable from the unpatentable, the Constitution does not require
optimality, merely a system that Congress designs to promote
technological progress through the incentive of a limited-term
monopoly.

254

255
The power to fashion such a system is committed to CongreSS
256
While others
and exercised by Congress in Title 35 of the US Code.
created
Congress
system
the
might have selected a different balance,
certainly promotes progress through the limited-term monopoly
established
has
Congress
offers. 257
it
incentive
technology-neutral restrictions on patentable subject matter and has
also shown itself capable of providing technology-specific exceptions
25 8
when it chooses to do so.

Once Congress has expressed its choice in the statute, the
courts have the power to interpret ambiguous statutes and to
determine the constitutionality of statutes. 259 Given the various
sections of the patent statute that are designed to protect the public
domain and promote progress, 260 and given the clarity and consistency
of Congress's definition of statutory subject matter, 26 1 what judicial
concerns motivate the need to engraft imitations on the broad
statutory definition? The following concerns emerge from the cases.

See supra Part I.A.
253.
See supra Part I.A.
254.
To promote the
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ...
255.
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (2006).
256.
See Patent, LEGAL INFO. INST., (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.law.cornell.
257.
edu/wex/patent.

Tax strategy patents and claims "directed to or encompassing a human organism"
258.
are specifically excluded from patentability. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 11229, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101). Nuclear weapons
technology is likewise excluded from patentability. 42 U.S.C. § 2181. In addition, Congress has
denied remedies for infringement of medical procedure patents. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
259.
The statute requires novelty, 35 U.S.C § 102, and non-obviousness, 35 U.S.C § 103,
260.
as well as enabling disclosure, 35 U.S.C §§ 111-112, and utility, 35 U.S.C § 101, as prerequisites
for patentability.
The statutory provisions covering patentable subject matter have remained
261.
substantively constant from 1790 through the major overhaul of the statute in 2011. See Part
I.B, supra.
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A. To Preclude Patents on "BigIdeas"
The theory underlying the Funk and Benson cases appears to
be that some ideas (i.e., principles of nature) are so far-reaching that
patent law cannot allow inventors to monopolize them. 26 2
The
rationale finds its most coherent expression in Justice Breyer's dissent
to the dismissal of certiorari in Labcorp.263
Justice Breyer explains that the problem is not that laws of
nature are easy, inexpensive, or obvious to discover, but rather that
allowing them to be patented grants too much protection and thereby
impedes the exchange of information and discourages research. 264
There are two problems with Justice Breyer's rationale. First,
it misunderstands the nature of a US patent. Patents are granted
only for innovations to which the public did not already have acceSS 2 6 5
and to which the public would be unlikely to obtain access but for the
disclosure by the patent applicant. 266 As the Supreme Court noted in
1933 in Dubilier:
Though often so characterized a patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly, for it is
not created by the executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the
community except the grantee of the patent. The term "monopoly" connotes the giving
of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling, working, or using a thing which the public
freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An
inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives
267
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.

262.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006)
263.
(Breyer, J., dissenting)
264.
The dissent also noted:
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that "laws of nature" are
obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary,
research into such matters may be costly and time-consuming; monetary incentives
may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great
benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too
much patent protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by
providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage
research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing
researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct
costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring
complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented
information, sometimes prohibitively so.
Id. at 126-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
265.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
266.
Id. § 103.
267.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (footnote
omitted).
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The inventor takes nothing from the public. In fact, by accepting a
patent, the inventor adds to public knowledge:
.

He may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its
disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. . .
the people,
[U]pon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to
26 8
who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.

The
Second, this rationale is extraordinarily bad policy.
greater the discovery, the greater the value derived from its
disclosure. Since a patent may claim only what the inventor has
discovered and can teach others how to make and use, 269 disclosure of
a "big idea" does not "imped[e] the free exchange of information," 270
but rather provides the starting point for others to investigate,
foreclosing them only from what the inventor can already explain how
to do.
Holding that "[pihenomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work" presumes a fixed and ascertainable distinction between basic
tools and other tools, a distinction that clearly depends on the state of
An eighteenth-century
technology and changes over time. 271
researcher would not have considered quantum theory a "basic
tool." 2 7 2 A twenty-first-century researcher would, but only because an
intervening inventor uncovered, developed, and disclosed the
information that made it a "basic tool." 2 73 The fundamental theory of
patent law is that the reward of a limited-term monopoly encourages
disclosure of what might otherwise be kept secret.2 74 Denying that
reward might discourage disclosure, thereby leaving a "fundamental
tool" unknown and unexploited by future scientists. 275 Likewise,
discoveries would not become "part of the storehouse of knowledge"
unless a discoverer decided to disclose them. 2 76

268.
Id. at 186-87.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
269.
A patent only precludes manufacture, use, sale or importation-not thought or
270.
discussion. See id. § 271.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
271.
See generally MAX PLANCK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUANTUM
272.
THEORY 1 (Ludwik Silberstein & Hans Thacher Clarke, trans., Oxford at the Clarendon Press
1922).
273.
Id.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
274.
275.
See id.
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property: A Fundamental But Important
276.
Concept, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 87, 93 (2009).
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B. To Prevent PrematurePatent Monopolies
A closely related concern is that patents may be granted to
incompletely developed ideas, foreclosing further development during
the term of the patent. 277 As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent
in Labcorp, finding the right balance between incentive and
overprotection is important in order to avoid stifling innovation. 278
Again, there are two flaws in this rationale. First, while it is
true that finding the correct balance is important, the Constitution
commits the responsibility of finding that balance to Congress. 279
Second, Congress has already struck such a balance: 35 U.S.C. §§ 101
and 112.280 If an inventor has grasped only the scientific principle, but
not a specific use, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 utility requirement will preclude
patentability. 28 1 If an inventor has appreciated only part of the
implications of a new discovery, the 35 U.S.C. § 112 requirement that
claims must be commensurate with the inventor's disclosure will limit
the scope of the patent-the inventor will obtain patent protection
only for what is in hand as evidenced by an enabling written
description. 282
C. To Prevent Withdrawing "Things that 'Everybody'Knows"from the
Public Domain
The Federal Circuit decision in Alappat reflects an approach,
since discredited, that treats mathematical algorithms and laws of
nature as generally known, and it looks to see if anything patentable
remains once the court removes these publicly known elements from
the claims. 283 The Supreme Court has rejected this approach,
cautioning against dissecting claims which should be treated as a
Furthermore, Congress has provided a better tool for
whole. 2 84
protecting the public domain: 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, which deny
patentability to claims that are not new, or which are obvious
advances over what the public already possesses. 285

See Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 106.
277.
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 US 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer,
278.
J., dissenting).
279.
See David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 96, 97 (2010).
280.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006).
Id. § 101.
281.
282.
Id. § 112.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
283.
284.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
285.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
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D. To Promote Efficiency in the Patent Office's Evaluation of
Applications
The Patent Office is charged with evaluating applications to
ensure that they meet all of the requirements of the statute before
they are issued as US patents. 286 Joshua Sarnoff argues that applying
§ 101 exceptions as a threshold requirement will reduce
administrative costs and the overall burden on the patent system. 287
Michael Risch argues that "abandoning subject matter restrictions in
favor of rigorous application of patentability requirements will not
necessarily lead to more patents in controversial areas."28 8
To be sure, some of the statutory requirements are more
difficult and time-consuming to evaluate than others. For example,
the 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 requirements can be tested only by first
establishing the state of the art, an often time-consuming exercise,
and one which cannot be done with complete assurance. 289 The patent
examiner may miss a publicly available document-for example, it
may be written in a foreign language or available only from an obscure
source. The difficulty of evaluation and risk of oversight is arguably
greater with respect to emerging technologies because the literature is
less organized, and much of it may still be unpublished. 290 Thus, one
might argue, excluding broad categories of early-stage inventions
would save the Patent Office time, and reduce the risk of granting a
patent that ultimately turns out to be invalid. 291 It would, however, do
so at the cost of removing the incentive of a patent from broad areas of
inquiry.
Moreover, while the efficiency argument may have theoretical
appeal, it does not reflect the manner in which the Patent Office
actually operates, nor does it provide additional efficiencies in
litigation. 292 Under its rules, the Patent Office instructs examiners to
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PROCEDURE § 702 (8th ed. rev. 8, 2010).
Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 106.
287.
Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 595 (2008).
288.
289.
35 U.S.C §§ 102, 103; see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2121-2141.

Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on Issues Related to the
290.
Identification of Prior Art During the Examination of a Patent Application, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,803,
28,804 (May 27, 1999).
An issued patent is presumed valid, but if it can be shown that the patent was
291.
issued because the examiner was unaware of a relevant prior art document the presumption can
be overcome and the patent invalidated. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Labs., 293 U.S. 1,
7 (1934).
See U.S.
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PROCEDURE § 2106.
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begin the substantive review of an application with an examination of
the prior art, not with an evaluation of patentable subject matter. 29 3
Under current "compact prosecution" practice, examiners are
instructed to consider all obstacles to patentability in the first
substantive response to the applicant. 294
Likewise, since a patent claim is invalid if it fails to meet any
one of the statutory requirements, a court is free to choose which
statutory barrier to focus on first and, having found one that bars
patentability, is free to stop its analysis at that point. 295
Thus, unless the Patent Office also changes its practices,
imposing additional statutory subject-matter requirements beyond
those Congress has already set would not increase efficiency, either at
the Patent Office or in the courts.
III. JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Judge Rader, dissenting in Bilski, raises a critical question:
With all of its legal sophistry, the [Federal Circuit] court's new test for eligibility today
does not answer the most fundamental question of all: why would the expansive
language of section 101 preclude protection of innovation simply because it is not
transformational or properly linked to a machine (whatever that means)? Stated even
296
more simply, why should some categories of invention deserve no protection?

There are two possible approaches to answering this question,
two types of justifications for judicial introduction of exceptions to the
statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101: (1) either the statute is
ambiguous and requires interpretation; or (2) the statute, although
clear, must be limited as a matter of constitutional law.
The
justification matters: if it is constitutionally mandated, then Congress
is without power to make a contrary policy judgment; if it is merely a
matter of statutory interpretation, then if Congress concludes that a
different interpretation
is preferable,
Congress (and most
appropriately Congress) can adjust the language to further the policy
it desires. 297
A. Statutory Command
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not appear ambiguous on
its face. It lists four categories of statutory subject matter and does
not exclude "phenomena of nature, mental processes, or abstract
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See id.
See id.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-104 (2006).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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intellectual concepts." 298 Congress has apparently had no difficulty
excluding specific types of inventions that would otherwise fit within
the four broad statutory categories and has done so most recently in
the 2011 America Invents Act. 299 The Supreme Court cautioned in
Dubilier,300 and repeated in Chakrabarty,that courts "should not read
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature
has not expressed."3 0 1 In Chakrabarty,the Court explained its role as
follows:
Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in
§ 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing,
our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the
302
legislative history and statutory purpose.

In a concurring opinion in Arrhythmia Research, Judge Rader
observed that, in Benson, the Supreme Court read into 35 U.S.C. § 101
"a limitation not found in the statute," noting no fewer than four times
that the limitation cannot be found in, or reasonably inferred from,
3
the statutory language.30
The Supreme Court cases provide no argument that the terms
"machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter," or "process" are
ambiguous. 304 In fact, in reviewing the changes over the more than
two-hundred-year history of the statute, the Court has found a
consistency in the meaning of these terms. 305 If there is a justification
for judicial intervention, then it must arise as a matter of
Constitutional necessity.

298.
35 U.S.C.§ 101.
299.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284,
327-28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101) (declaring tax strategies within the prior art and
thereby excluding them from patentability and declaring human organisms unpatentable).
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933).
300.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
301.
Id. at 315.
302.
Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053, 1061-62 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
303.
(Rader, J., concurring). The court wrote:
[1] The language of section 101 conveys no implication that the Act extends patent
protection to some subcategories of machines or processes and not to others. [2] The
limits on patentable subject matter within section 101 focus not on subcategories of
machines or processes, but on characteristics, such as newness and usefulness....
[3] [The language of the Patent Act does not suggest that the words "machine" or
"process" carry limitations outside their ordinary meaning.... [4] Rather the Act, by
its terms, extends patent protection to "any" machine or process which satisfies the
other conditions of patentability.
Id.
See e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; Dubilier 289 U.S. at 178; Arrhythmia, 958
304.
F.2d at 1053.
See discussion of statutory history, supra Part I.A.
305.
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B. ConstitutionalRequirement
If there is an underlying constitutional mandate that
"phenomena of nature, mental processes, or abstract intellectual

concepts" must be excluded from the reach of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Supreme Court has not articulated it.306
While never explicitly called upon to rule on the
constitutionality of § 101, the Court has frequently commented on the
section without expressing any doubt as to its constitutionality. As
early as McClurg v. Kingsland, the Court held that "the powers of
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the
terms of the Constitution." 30 7 The statement in Chakrabarty that
"Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable
subject matter in § 101" certainly suggests that there is no
constitutional requirement to modify the language of the statute. 308
The statement in Labcorp that "the reason for the exclusion is that
sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"' after conceding
that
"research
into
such matters
may be
costly
and
time-consuming .... and that research may prove of great benefit to
the human race," is a criticism of line-drawing, rather than a
constitutional shortcoming. 309 The Constitution charges Congress
with promoting progress, not finding a hypothetical optimal point of
promotion. 310
IV. POLICY

The extensive history of the inconstancy of judicial exclusions
from the clear statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the difficulty
of the lower courts in interpreting the exclusions are powerful
arguments that such judicial intervention is unwise. The uncertainty
created by this interference with Congress's policy determination
raises costs to participants and to society in general. It raises both
processing costs at the patent prosecution stage and costs of litigation
necessitated by uncertainty. It also raises costs to society, which,
although unquantifiable, are also undeniable; uncertainty discourages

306.
See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843); see also Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. at 315.
307.
McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206.
308.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315.
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer,
309.
J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
310.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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investment in all emerging technologies, including those technologies
of greatest potential value. 311
The fact that neither the Federal Circuit nor even some
members of the Supreme Court can fathom the limits of patentable
subject matter should be motivation enough to put an end to judicial
intervention. 3 12 The Court has had to address the issue of statutory
subject matter directly 31 3 and tangentially 314 more than a dozen times
and has never been able to reach a unanimous decision.31 5
Admittedly, some parties may benefit from ambiguity. To the
extent that there is doubt as to the availability of patent protection,
some inventors will be motivated to forego the cost and effort of
applying for a patent.3 16 To the extent that there is doubt as to the
validity of a patent, some patentees will be motivated to forego the
cost and effort of infringement litigation. Thus, some infringers will,
in fact, benefit from ambiguity at the expense of inventors and
patentees. These are not, however, the parties whose interests the
Constitution charges Congress to "promote" in Article I, Section 8.317
The recent Golan case might suggest otherwise. In justifying
the extension of copyright protection to public domain works, Justice
Ginsburg noted that motivating creation of works of authorship was
not the sole goal of the Intellectual Property Clause. "Evidence from
the founding, moreover, suggests that inducing dissemination-as
opposed to creation-was viewed as an appropriate means to promote
science." 318

311.
See Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin, Benefits and Costs of an Opposition Process,
in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 120, 122 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A.
Merrill eds., 2003).
See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
312.
See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at
313.
3218; Labcorp, 548 U.S. at 124; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419
(1891); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498
(1874); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); United States v. Dubilier
314.
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
See supra note 313.
315.
Foregoing patent protection will usually mean maintaining trade secrecy, imposing
316.
a cost on society. See generally, e.g., Shawn McDonald, Patenting Floppy Disks, or How the
Federal Circuit'sAcquiescence Has Filled the Void Left by Legislative Inaction, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH.
9 (1998) (discussing that during a period when patentability of software inventions was
uncertain, software inventors chose trade secrecy or copyright protection-which permitted
preservation of trade secrets-rather than risk applying for patents).
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
317.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). Note, however, that this argument
318.
related to the dissemination of ideas through publication of copyrightable works, not
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In fact, the very argument that judicial exceptions are
necessary to prevent monopolization of emerging technologies proves
the opposite-without the disclosure of the discovery, the field would
not even exist. 319 If the uncertainty introduced by judicial exceptions
makes financing unavailable, or motivates innovators to look
elsewhere, then the field will not develop, increasing the cost to society
more than any conceivable cost that might be imposed by a
limited-term monopoly. 320 Even if innovators still choose to innovate
without the patent incentive, they will be forced, in the absence of
patent protection, to rely on trade secret protection instead. 321 This
will work "against the developers and even society as a whole. Rather
than promoting information exchange and technological innovation,
trade secrecy encourages developers to hoard their inventions; this
forces software developers to 'spend much of their efforts reinventing
the wheel . . ."'322 It would be hard to construct an argument that the
goal of the Intellectual Property Clause is to encourage secrecy.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION

The fundamental problem with the current judicial limitations
on statutory subject matter is not so much the exclusion or inclusion of
certain types of inventions, but rather the ambiguity and uncertainty
which results from judicial intervention in a policy decision. Congress
should reassert its role as policy maker.
If Congress concludes that phenomena of nature, mental
processes and abstract intellectual concepts should not be patentable,
revising the statute to explicitly exclude these categories from
patentability would remove a source of ambiguity and improve the
efficiency of the patent system. 323 More importantly, it would return
dissemination of products incorporating patentable inventions. The function of disseminating
ideas is served with respect to patents by publication of the patent, which by virtue of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 must contain enough information to teach how to make and use the invention. See 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
319.
See supra Part II.D.
320.
The argument might be made that some other innovator will eventually make the
same invention. Not only is this speculative, but if it is true that it is likely that someone else
would come up with the same idea, the invention would probably be unpatentable under the
obviousness standard of 35 U.S.C. § 103.
321.
See Chad King, Note, Abort, Retry, Fail:Protection for Software-Related Inventions
in the Wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1118, 1157-58 (2000).
322.
Id. at 1159-60 (quoting Lee A. Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for
CongressionalAction on Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283, 286 (1996)).
323.
Congress took just such a step in 1952 when it added § 103 to the patent statute,
codifying the judicially created principle of rejecting patents on obvious advances. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 103; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
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the policy decision to the branch to which it was committed by the
Constitution.
If Congress concludes that judicial intervention is contrary to
its policy decision as reflected in the language it chose for 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, it has the power to act. Judicial intervention is not
constitutionally mandated. While it might seem odd to single out
certain items as included within what otherwise appears to be a broad
and open-ended definition, the Supreme Court's foray into patent
A simple statutory
policy makes such a step necessary.
phenomena of
"including
words
the
example,
for
amendment-adding,
which
concepts
nature, mental processes, or abstract intellectual
otherwise meet the requirements of this statute"-would solve the
problem.
Even if Congress concludes that there is no harm at the
moment, it is difficult to predict how the judicial restrictions might
For
affect the development of emerging or future technologies.
example, no one would suggest that current machines are products of
As
nature-they are too complex and too clearly manmade.
the
approaches
of
machine
nanotechnology develops and the concept
molecular scale, the dividing line may become less obvious.
The impact on currently unforeseen technologies is even harder
to predict. The risk of a limited-term monopoly would seem less costly
to society than the risk of the permanent loss of a valuable technology
because the technology is never developed. Reasonable people could
disagree on which risk is preferable and where, as a matter of policy,
Congress should draw the line between the patentable and the
unpatentable. What seems beyond reasonable disagreement, however,
is that Congress is the appropriate branch of government to decide the
policy matter and draw that line.

